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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2195 
___________ 
 
JAMAAL TURNQUEST, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN ALLENWOOD LSCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-12-cv-01654) 
District Judge:  A. Richard Caputo  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 4, 2016 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 5, 2016 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jamaal Turnquest, a federal prisoner, appeals from the District Court’s order 
denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition alleging that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) erred 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
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in calculating the date on which his federal sentence commenced.  For the reasons given, 
we will affirm. 
 Turnquest was a conspirator in a wide-ranging conspiracy to distribute cocaine.  
He was ultimately convicted of two drug-related offenses in Maryland.  In 2007, the 
Circuit Court for Cecil County, Maryland, sentenced him to eight years in prison for 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine to be served after a 15-month prison term for 
an earlier drug-conviction. 
 In January 2008, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum for Turnquest, as he also 
faced federal charges stemming from his role in the conspiracy.  Turnquest was found 
guilty of conspiring to distribute five kilograms or more of crack cocaine and 50 grams or 
more of crack cocaine, and he was sentenced on August 10, 2010.  At sentencing, the 
parties informed the sentencing court that Turnquest had suffered convictions in 
Maryland, and that he was in state custody before being transferred to federal court for 
trial.  The sentencing court sentenced him to 264 months in prison,1 and it noted that it 
had departed downward from the guidelines recommendation to account for the two years 
he spent in state custody—from his arrest in 2006 until he was transferred to federal 
custody in 2008.  The record from the sentencing hearing indicates that the parties and 
                                                                                                                                                  
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The sentence also included five years of supervised release, a fine, and a special 
assessment. 
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the sentencing court believed that Turnquest had been paroled from his state prison 
terms.2  The sentencing court was silent as to whether Turnquest’s federal sentence was 
to run concurrently or consecutively with his state-court sentences.   
 Turnquest was later returned to state custody and served the remainder of his state 
court sentence.  At the conclusion of that sentence, on November 7, 2011, he was 
transferred to federal custody.  The BOP determined that his 264-month federal sentence 
commenced on that date.  The BOP also credited him for 15 days that he spent in state 
custody but was not awarded on his state sentence.  Believing that the sentencing court 
intended to give him credit for all of the time he spent in state custody, Turnquest wrote 
the sentencing court, requesting that it order the BOP to credit him time from January 
2008, when he was transferred to federal custody, to November 7, 2011, when he finished 
serving his state sentence.  The sentencing court denied this request, noting that its 
original sentence varied downward to account for Turnquest’s for the two years spent in 
state custody before his sentencing hearing and that he was not entitled to any additional 
credit.   
                                              
2 Turnquest alleges that the State granted him parole in abstentia in 2009.  At sentencing, 
his attorney informed the court that he was “essentially paroled” from the state court 
convictions.  He further alleges, however, that the State later reversed its parole grant as 
improvident, and that he was returned to Maryland’s custody until November 7, 2011.  
The crux of his claim here is that, had the sentencing court been aware that he was still 
serving state prison sentences, it would have ordered the federal sentence to run 
concurrently with those prison terms.    
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 Turnquest then filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the jurisdiction where is he confined, 
seeking credit toward his federal sentence for time served in state custody.  In his traverse 
to the government’s response, Turnquest clarified that he sought credit on his federal 
sentence from January 2008 to November 7, 2011.  The District Court determined that, 
because Turnquest was in Maryland’s primary custody when he was sentenced on the 
federal convictions, the sentencing court had the authority to determine whether his 
federal sentence would run concurrently or consecutively to his state sentence.  
Furthermore, because the sentencing court was silent on that point, the sentences were, by 
statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), to run consecutively.  Hence, the BOP correctly 
determined that Turnquest’s federal sentence did not begin until November 7, 2011, the 
date he completed his state sentence.  In addition, the District Court determined that the 
BOP correctly awarded Turnquest 15 days for time served on his state sentence because 
he had not previously been awarded credit for those days.3    
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Turnquest’s habeas petition pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241.  See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2005).  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s denial of 
his habeas petition de novo.  See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
                                              
3 Turnquest does not challenge that determination on appeal, and we will not address it 
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The only issue presented in this appeal is whether the District Court erred in 
denying Turnquest’s § 2241 petition, which challenged only the BOP’s calculation of his 
federal prison sentence.4  We agree with the District Court that Turnquest has not shown 
that the BOP erred in that calculation.   
The Attorney General, who acts through the BOP, has the authority to calculate a 
federal sentence and provide credit for time served.  United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 
329, 333-35 (1992).  In calculating a sentence, the BOP first determines when the 
sentence commenced and then determines whether the prisoner is entitled to any credits 
toward that sentence.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3585.  Based on the information before it, the 
BOP correctly determined that Turnquest’s federal sentence began on November 7, 2011.  
Because the sentencing court did not order the federal sentence to run concurrently with 
Turnquest’s previously imposed state sentences, the BOP was required to treat his federal 
sentence as running consecutively to his state sentences.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) 
(“Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the 
court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.”); see also Elwell v. Fisher, 716 F.3d 
477, 482 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting that the plain language of § 3584(a) requires state and 
                                                                                                                                                  
here.    
4 To the extent that Turnquest sought to challenge the legality of his sentence—by 
arguing that the sentencing court could not, under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines § 5G1.3, impose a consecutive sentence—he could not raise that claim in his 
§ 2241 petition, and the District Court would have lack jurisdiction to decide it.  See In re 
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997) (recognizing that 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not § 
2241, is the proper means for a federal prisoner to challenge the legality of their 
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federal sentences imposed at different times to run consecutive, unless the court orders 
the terms to run concurrently).5  Furthermore, there is no dispute that Turnquest was 
released to federal authorities on November 7, 2011.  Accordingly, the BOP correctly 
determined that his federal sentence commenced on that date.  18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (“A 
sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in 
custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of 
sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.”); see also 
Blood v. Bledsoe, 648 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that, pursuant to § 3585(a), a 
sentence commences on the date the defendant is received in custody).   
Moreover, as the District Court concluded, the BOP was justified in not awarding 
credit toward Turnquest’s federal sentence for the time he served in state custody before 
November 7, 2011.  Section 3585(b) prohibits the BOP from crediting a federal sentence 
with time that has already been credited toward another sentence.  See Wilson, 503 U.S. 
329, 337 (1992) (“Congress made clear [in § 3585(b)] that a defendant could not receive 
a double credit for his detention time.”).  Accordingly, because Turnquest received credit 
toward his state sentence for his time spent in custody, he was not also entitled to credit 
                                                                                                                                                  
confinement).   
5 We do not consider Turnquest’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the 
sentencing court was unaware that he would be returned to state custody, and, had it 
known, it would have ordered the terms to be served concurrently as suggested by the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5G1.3.  This contention does not bear on the only 
issue here:  Whether the BOP correctly calculated Turnquest’s federal sentence based on 
the information before it. 
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from BOP for that time.6 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.7 
                                              
6 As discussed above, Turnquest alleges that the State granted him parole in 2009, while 
he was in federal custody, but later reversed that decision and returned him to state prison 
until November 7, 2011.  Turnquest does not claim a resulting gap in credit, nor does he 
allege that the State refused to credit that time toward his state sentence.  Because he 
received credit for that period toward his state sentence, the BOP did not err in declining 
to provide him with double credit.  § 3585(b).   
7 Turnquest’s two motions to supplement the record are denied.  We note that the motions 
contained argument directed at the merits.  We considered that argument in reaching this 
decision.  Our opinion and judgment is without prejudice to Turnquest seeking relief 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) from the sentencing judge. 
